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WHAT Is YOUR ANTHROPOLOGY? WHAT ARE YOUR ETHICS? 
W e tend to think of the great ridge that rose up inside the historical profession some three decades 
ago, splitting historians into two camps, as 
some kind of epistemological event. Ancient 
disagreements about the nature ( and exis-
tence) of truth suddenly became more 
extreme and divisive. Now, the biggest flags 
wave over the "relativists" on one side, and 
the ''truth seekers" on the other. Smaller ban-
ners ("moderate historicists," "construc-
tivists," "positivists," etc.) fly here and there 
along the slopes of lower-lying ranges on 
each side of the great divide, itself breached 
by passes and tunnels excavated by historians 
loathe to commit themselves to either camp. 
But there is another way of looking at 
what divides historians. Who we think we are 
affects what we think we can know: "We are 
encouraged these days," Thomas Nagel has 
pointed out, "to think of ourselves as contin-
gent organisms arbitrarily thrown up by evo-
lution. There is no reason in advance to 
expect a finite creature like that to be able to 
do more than accumulate information at the 
perceptual and conceptual level it occupies 
by nature."' 
I argue (from the standpoint of philosoph-
ical realism) that disagreements rooted in dif-
ferent epistemological assumptions might 
also be understood as rival ways of answering 
the question, "Who is the human person?" I 
find it curious that even as we cram our jour-
nals with articles about "identity," we don't 
seem to acknowledge the deeper differences 
over how we define the most fundamental of 
all identities. I argue, furthermore, that these 
differences in philosophical anthropology 
have ethical consequences for the writing of 
history: different anthropologies lead to fun-
damentally different ethics of knowledge. 
And those ethics come into play whenever 
historians choose topics to investigate, apply 
methods of research, and propose interpreta-
tions. 
First, to the anthropological question. Of 
all the branches of philosophy, Henri-lrenee 
Marrou argued, historical knowledge depends 
most on that dealing with anthropology. He 
likened the historian's chosen philosophy of 
man to an axle or a nervous system, so that 
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what we write as historians "stands or falls" 
with our philosophical anthropology, our idea 
of the human person.2 Most historians agree 
that we need to take into account both the 
spontaneity and creativity of the individual 
person as well as the limits and conditions 
that restrict individual freedom. So, just who 
is this free being who makes history, includ-
ing the ideologies and institutions that condi-
tion his or her very freedom? 
One reason that the question has excited so 
little interest among historians may be the 
extreme historicism that prevails today. Of 
what use is a theory of the person when one 
assumes that all of man's works and his very 
identity are nothing but expressions of histo-
ry itself, and therefore merely relative to 
some time and place?3 What passed for philo-
sophical anthropology in the 20th century 
ended up being the reductio ad absurdum of 
Rousseau's idea of man as malleable, bereft 
of any fixed nature. "Man is what has hap-
pened to him, what he has done," said Jose 
Ortega y Gasset, theorist of historicism. "This 
is why it makes no sense to put limits on what 
man is capable of being." Man has no nature, 
the Spanish philosopher declared; he only has 
a history.4 
It is, I submit, this particularly miserable 
idea of the human person-namely, the belief 
that our nature is nothing but our historici-
ty-that ultimately accounts for the vague 
sensation among some of us that in reading a 
good deal of history today we are drinking 
from a poisoned well. What's wrong with the 
water is not so much the relativistic assump-
tions about knowledge and truth but its 
Rousseauian naturalism. The water is not 
potable because it is not compatible with 
whom we know ourselves to be. 
Why should historians be guided by a 
belief in man's essential nature? Because 
without it, anything man does, as well as any-
thing he has done, is as valuable or as value-
less as anything else. History would be mean-
ingless. Sitting down to write a constitution, 
hauling coal out of the ground, or nursing a 
baby would be substantially equivalent to, 
say, clobbering your brother to death with a 
blunt instrument. Or, as one philosopher com-
mented at a public forum a couple of weeks 
after September 11, 2001, since there was no 
such thing as evil, the Twin Towers catastro-
phe really had no special meaning at all. It 
was, he declared, "just another plane crash." 
Unlike most historians, Thomas Klubock 
has helpfully called specific attention to his 
belief in Rousseauian naturalism. The need 
for more studies of "homosocial networks 
and ties" is obstructed by "an implicit 
assumption of naturalized heterosexuality, of 
an inevitable male-female binary opposi-
tion. "5 Similarly, Steven C. Topik proposed a 
vast research program to answer the question, 
"does coffee production impose certain struc-
tures and world views?" His hypothesis that a 
wide range of beliefs, actions, and attitudes 
might be determined by the simple fact ofliv-
ing in a coffee-growing region of the world 
was grounded in what he approvingly called 
a "central observation" of Karl Marx: that 
man only "'begins to distinguish himself 
from the animal the moment he begins to pro-
duce his means of subsistence, a step required 
by his physical organization . . . . What they 
[individuals] are, therefore, coincides with 
what they produce and how they produce. 
The nature of individuals thus depends on the 
material conditions which determine their 
production. "' 6 It is hard to believe that Topik 
really thinks that what he himself is "coin-
cides" with the books and articles that he has 
written and how he has written them, or that 
he thinks that, in thus producing his own 
"means of subsistence," he unveils the only 
difference between Steve Topik and, say, a 
grasshopper or a grizzly bear. 
The anthropologist Sidney Mintz's Worker 
in the Cane: A Puerto Rican Life History, first 
published in 1960, is still in print and remains 
a model for a new kind of history, according 
to the historian Florencia Mallon. The book is 
the product of hundreds of hours of conversa-
tions between Mintz and Eustaquio (Taso) 
Zayas Alvarado, a Puerto Rican cane cutter 
and father of ten children. Evidently, Taso 
attracted Mintz's interest because of his par-
ticipation in union and left-wing political 
causes and his intelligence and above-aver-
age leadership abilities. But not long after 
Mintz undertook the interviews, Taso con-
verted from a non-practicing Catholic to the 
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Pentecostal Church of God, withdrawing 
from union and political causes. Astounded 
and disappointed, Mintz realized that his pro-
letarian hero had feet of clay. 
In the course of thirteen pages in the last 
part of the book, Mintz desperately sorts 
through a series of social, economic, ideolog-
ical, and psychological explanations for 
Taso's conversion before settling on the pos-
sibility that "conversion to a revivalist sect 
may be viewed as a way of increasing one's 
social and economic mobility." Or maybe 
Taso was just overcome by guilt feelings of 
some kind. Mintz invited the reader to share 
his own chilling conclusion: to see in Taso's 
life "the waste I think I see: the waste of a 
mind that stands above the others."7 Taso, the 
reader is left to infer, is nothing more than an 
animal who reasons, and whether he reasons 
well or badly, according to Mintz's precepts, 
is the only thing that interests the researcher. 
There is no place here for a spiritual dimen-
sion to which politics and class struggle 
might rightly be subordinated. 
Historians may have rejected the existence 
of a human nature. But they have, strangely 
enough, embraced with enthusiasm Marx's 
Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach: "The philoso-
phers have only interpreted the world, in var-
ious ways; the point, however, is to change 
it."8 The application of Marx's thesis depends 
on the absence of any coherent philosophical 
anthropology, which would pose an intolera-
ble restriction on the freedom of historians to 
advance their favorite political projects. 
But what accounts for this compulsion to 
see and judge everything in terms of some 
emancipatory political project? "In the 
absence of religious belief," Anthony Daniels 
suggests, the compulsion "answers man's 
need for a purpose that transcends the hum-
drum tasks and flux of day-to-day existence 
in a settled democratic society. In doing so, it 
reassures the individual of his personal sig-
nificance even as he frets about his insignifi-
cance." As the border between personal life 
and the political realm breaks down, other 
limits seem to melt away. The compulsion 
intensifies, "even as some of its ostensible 
ends are met."9 Perhaps this is what accounts 
for the rapture with which so many historians 
and other scholars gaze upon the life of the 
late Michel Foucault. Here was a brave intel-
lectual, they say, who tried to live as if he did-
n't really believe there was any moral differ-
ence between the assassin and the victim. To 
live in that way no doubt does takes a certain 
amount of courage. Foucault lived and died 
according to the Eleventh · Thesis on 
Feuerbach even as he declared the death of 
the very idea of a philosophical anthropology. 
"To die for the love of boys," Foucault sighed 
the year before his death of AIDS in 1984. 
"What could be more beautiful?" 10 But what 
about "the boys?" They were sheer historici-
ty, which is to say, nothing. 
The problem is an ethical one, but it is first 
of all anthropological. To speak of "moral 
rules and principles," according to the 
philosopher John Rist, ''without reference to 
the nature of man and of each man risks being 
if not literal nonsense, at least abstract, use-
less, even dangerous fantasy-such as that of 
abstract liberalism." Every ethical enuncia-
tion invariably assumes some "theory about 
the kind of beings who can contemplate," 
whatever ethical goal is proposed. This 
means that every ethical theory is also a nat-
ural law theory, and that the best moral theo-
ries will therefore be linked to some "truer, 
more defensible accounts of human nature." 11 
I would argue, therefore, that the great 
ridge that divides historians is best conceived 
as one that separates us according to radical-
ly different theories of the person. The domi-
nant one reduces man to a material expres-
sion of the natural world, not essentially dif-
ferent from an animal. A much longer and 
more humane tradition began with Aristotle, 
flourished under the influence of St. 
Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, and 
ripened in the 20th century with the develop-
ment of the philosophy of personalism. 12 This 
tradition yields accounts of the past shaped 
by the conviction that the human person, as 
an embodied spirit created to fulfill a specific 
vocation in life, is more than a self-made 
"identity" or "producer," that there are 
aspects of human nature that are unchange-
able, and that to flout them is to invite disas-
ter. Historians who approach the past with 
these premises may well tackle the same top-
ics as their colleagues on the other side of the 
ridge, but they pose different kinds of ques-
tions and offer interpretations of another 
order. 
Of course, historians rarely announce their 
philosophical anthropologies. Detecting them 
may be difficult or impossible. But that does-
n't mean they are irrelevant. Without refer-
ring directly to either anthropology or person-
alism, the historian Fran~ois Xavier Guerra 
showed just how powerfully influential a per-
sonalist-oriented philosophy can be in the 
writing of history. Arguing against the ten-
dency of so many historians to attribute pri-
mary causal authority to abstract economic, 
social, demographic, and mental "structures" 
and "forces," Guerra asked: "What are these 
structures but a formalization of relations 
between men and nature, or between men and 
other men?" The ultimate subject of every 
historical inquiry is the human person, acting 
as an individual or as a member of a group. 
To assume, as we often do, that individual 
persons merely represent or incarnate some 
nation, people, or social group ("the peas-
antry," "the landless," etc.) is a grave method-
ological error.13 
One of the most striking consequence of 
these distinctive anthropologies lies in their 
corresponding ethics of knowledge. The 
Rousseauian anthropology yields a utilitarian 
ethics. The Aristotelian anthropology's 
assumption of an essential human nature 
links it naturally with a virtue-based ethics; 
having certain virtues makes possible the 
attainment of the telos imposed by human 
nature. In the first paragraph of his classic 
introduction to historiography, Marrou asked, 
"What is the correct behavior of reason in the 
field of history?" What were "the virtues of 
the historian"? Here, ethics is not about codes 
of professional conduct or rules against pla-
giarism. There is a deeper ethic at play-an 
ethics of knowledge or a normative episte-
mology-that governs the selection of topics, 
the purpose of research, the choice of 
hypotheses and interpretations. 
Essays devoted to ethical self-reflection of 
a rather different order have multiplied in the 
academy during the last decade or so. "The 
mission of the African-American scholar," 
Peter J. Paris of Princeton University 
declared in his 1995 inaugural address as 
president of the American Academy of 
Religion, "is a moral mission, because its 
final aim is the realization of racial justice in 
the nation's thought and practice." The main 
purpose of feminist research, according to 
Gesa E. Kirsch, is to "empower [women] to 
change the conditions of their lives." To 
Clifford Christians, a "basic norm" of what 
has come to be called "interpretive research" 
is that of "enabling the humane transforma-
tion of the multiple spheres of community 
life-religion, politics, ethnicity, gender, and 
so forth." 14 For the Yale historian Emilia 
Viotti da Costa, historians ought to be open-
ing up "new roads to a more open and truly 
democratic world, where all people of differ-
ent genders, classes, ethnicities, religions, 
and nationalities will come together to partic-
ipate equally in the wealth of the world."ts 
These pronouncements represent utilitari-
an ethics at its crudest. The past is a databank 
to be pillaged for the advancement of one or 
another social change project. The underlying 
anthropology seems to be that of the natural-
ist conception of the human person as nothing 
more than a complex animal thrown up by 
evolution. On this view, there can be no logi-
cal rejoinder to the manipulation or distortion 
of the past in the service of ideology. None of 
the scholars just quoted hints at a theory of 
the person. To have done so might have sunk 
them in a morass of contradiction-between 
their utopian goals and reality, between the 
evident necessity to know the truth even 
when the truth fails to point to utopia. Nor do 
any of them propose any objective grounding 
for the moral purposes that they think should 
guide research. Precisely why should I orient 
my work toward the "humane transformation 
of the multiple spheres," etc.? 
On the other hand, since the 1980s episte-
mologists and ethicists have been investigat-
ing the special way in which virtue ethics 
applies to the production of knowledge. "The 
fundamental questions of epistemology," 
wrote Linda Zagzebski, "are varieties of the 
question 'How ought we to go about finding 
out the truth?' or 'What counts as a good 
belief?' or 'What gives us understanding?"' 
The goodness of knowledge, she argued, "is 
partially constituted by the motive to get it." 
What Aristotelians and Thomists call "the 
intellectual virtues" are nothing but forms of 
moral virtues, which is why "epistemic eval-
uation is a form of moral evaluation." 16 
Similarly, Gilbert Meilaender, citing 
Augustine, Aquinas, and John Henry 
Newman, argued that knowledge which is not 
acquired in accord with what we know to be 
good is illicit. Knowledge is not something 
that one picks up in a supposedly autonomous 
intellectual sphere; its acquisition depends on 
prior knowledge of what is good and on the 
proper motivation.17 
Perhaps this is what Octavio Paz had in 
mind when, four years before his death in 
1998, he wrote, "The exercise of criticism 
demands intelligence and likewise character, 
moral rigor." Denouncing "evil," "lies," "the 
nihilism of relativity," and the "ideological 
intoxication" of so many Latin American 
intellectuals, Paz exalted the virtues and even 
proposed a recovery of religious tradition.18 
Though Paz is not known to have been a 
believer, his words make him an intellectual 
companion of the great French Thomist, A. -
D Sertillanges, who long ago reminded 
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would-be scholars that "the purity of thought 
presupposes purity of the soul." 19 
Perhaps it is time for historians to begin 
asking each other, and their students, "What's 
your anthropology? What's your ethics?" 
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